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CENTER COLLOQUIUM
ARTICLES
SUPPORT AND DEFEND: CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA
Mark R. Shulman
I, [name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I
take this obligation freely, without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well
and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which
I am about to enter. So help me God.1
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional linchpins of human rights—most
notably regular elections, habeas corpus, freedom of expression,
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and civilian control of the military—ensure that the people
remain sovereign in a democratic society by allowing them to
hold governments accountable. These instruments work to
prevent arbitrariness in government. They enable the people to
speak and ensure that their leaders will hear. They imply too
that the government will respond appropriately with remedies
for valid complaints. Without any one of these constitutional
linchpins, substantive human rights could not be enforced. In
such circumstances, governments may still recognize the claims
of individuals—but only by grace, not by right.
Each of these relational elements is necessary to ensure that
human rights are protected.2 The significance of each particular
element has been examined at length. For instance, much has
been written about the critical roles that regular elections and
the freedom of expression play in promoting responsive
government. Likewise, the US policies and practices for
detaining alleged terrorists have, over the past ten years, given
the study of habeas corpus a tremendous boost. But, the fourth
element, civilian control of the military, remains less developed.3
This Article explores civil-military relations in the United States
and their connection to human rights, taking a pair of
important new books as a prompt and a springboard for further
exploration.
This Article starts out by explaining why robust civil-military
relations matter. Without meaningful and reliable civilian
2. The US National Security Strategy articulates a similar list in explaining the
importance of promoting democracy abroad by working to strengthen “key institutions
of democratic accountability—free and fair electoral processes, strong legislatures,
civilian control of militaries, honest police forces, independent and fair judiciaries, a
free and independent press, a vibrant private sector, and a robust civil society.” THE
WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
37 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
national_security_strategy.pdf.
3. Surprisingly few scholars have attempted significant studies of the civil-military
relationship in the United States. To the author’s knowledge, no one has completed a
more thorough examination of civil-military relations since Samuel P. Huntington
published his magisterial work, The Soldier and the State, in 1957. SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVILMILITARY RELATIONS (Vintage Books 1964) (1957); see Deborah N. Pearlstein, The
Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(providing an extensive review of the literature and analyzing the ways in which
professional military advice does, does not, and can better conform to separation of
powers theory).
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control of the military, governments lose some measure of
control over the destiny of their nation. In extreme
circumstances it can even lead an overthrow of government. Part
I discusses A More Perfect Military: How the Constitution Can Make
Our Military Stronger by law professor Diane Mazur, a new book
that examines recent civil-military relations in the United States.
Her carefully constructed work maintains that since the Vietnam
era, the United States Supreme Court has hewn the armed
forces from general society in order to create a separate—and
more socially conservative—sphere. Part II discusses The Decline
and Fall of the American Republic by constitutional scholar Bruce
Ackerman, a wise and wide-ranging book that argues that the
nation’s polity is in decline and that the increasingly politicized
armed forces may ultimately lead to a coup. Part III asks where
we go from here. The important books under discussion
attribute a thinning of the civilian control over the military to
legal and political decisions made over the past thirty years.
They explain some of the most critical implications of this
transformation and they offer sensible proposals about how to
improve that critical relationship for the sake of enhancing the
effectiveness of our armed forces and the vitality of our republic.
But, neither work examines the evolving nature of great power
politics since the end of the Cold War, the effects new
technologies have on long-standing distinctions and borders, or
the relative rise of nonstate actors including Al Qaeda—three
sets of exogenous factors that inevitably drive changes in the
civil-military relationship. So in the end, these books point to a
more ambitious enterprise, reexamining the relationship
between force and twenty-first century society.
The remarkable events of the Arab Spring in 2011
illuminate important truths about the nature of governments
and governance. Most notably, in order to rule, civilian
leadership must exercise consistent and reliable control over the
state’s security apparatus. In the case of repressive regimes,
stability may not be normatively desirable, but it remains
significant nonetheless. Without the ability to control the army,
almost any regime will fall. This lesson may seem obvious or
axiomatic, but it bears repeating and illustrating. The Tunisian
military’s refusal to support the long-standing regime in the face
of a popular uprising condemned President Zine El Abidine
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Ben Ali to a rapid fall from power.4 Shortly thereafter, the world
watched anxiously to see whether the Egyptian military would
remain loyal to the regime of President Hosni Mubarak or shift
the balance of power to the protesters crowding Cairo’s Tahrir
Square. Much like their counterparts in Tunisia, the Egyptian
military tried to play the role of an honest broker, effectively
denying support to the president and thus ensuring the
protesters the space in which to give effect to their revolution.5
Months after Mubarak fled Cairo, the military continues to
exercise power, running the interim government.6 In contrast,
the armed forces of Bahrain and Syria have thus far remained
mostly obedient to their governments, which in turn have, to
date, survived.7 The case of Libya illustrates a third way. The
Libyan military split on supporting the regime of Muammar
Muhammad el-Qaddafi, resulting in a bitter and protracted civil
war.8 In every instance where the military has fully supported the
government, the government survived. Where the military
turned against the national leadership, the governments fell.
And where the military has vacillated, violent conflict and
political indeterminacy ensued.
These examples demonstrate several elemental points.
Civilian control of the military is not necessarily binary. When a
nation’s armed forces take orders from the civilian leadership,
the government has a good chance of retaining power. When
the military is not absolutely obedient, the regime’s ability to
govern is significantly diminished. When the military defects, a
change in leadership invariably results. The events of the Arab
Spring offer a timely and poignant reminder of a role that
armed forces play in the life and death of a state—a role
generally downplayed, but nevertheless very real in the United
4. See David Kirkpatrick, Military Backs New Leaders in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2011, at A4; Ousted Tunisian Strongman Convicted of Corruption Charges, CNN, June 20,
2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-20/world/tunisia.ben.ali_1_corruption-chargesabidine-ben-ali-tunisians?_s=PM:WORLD.
5. See, e.g., Larisa Epatko, What is the Role of the Military in Egypt’s Transition?, THE
RUNDOWN, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 7, 2011 3:00 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
rundown/2011/02/egypt-military.html.
6. See David Kirkpatrick, Military Flexes Its Muscles as Islamists Gain in Egypt, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at A6.
7. See, e.g., Zoltan Barany, The Role of the Military, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 24, 31–34
(2011).
8. See, e.g., id. at 28–31.
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States. When the government does not exercise a monopoly on
the use of large-scale violence, the regime’s effectiveness and
longevity becomes less certain. This lesson might seem selfevident, but it is worth spelling out because of its momentous
implications.
Of course, the Arab Spring examples have significant
limitations in their heuristic value for a study of the United
States. The affected countries were not functional democracies
with robust rule of law systems and traditions of ordered liberty.
They were run by people who had risen through the military or
taken power through military means. Their institutions of civil
society were meager. Their cultures were imbued with
discontent, particularly among the vast portion of society that is
young and under- or unemployed. The armed forces themselves
were more oriented toward state security roles than those of warfighting. This orientation may have made the military more
likely to make autonomous decisions about whether to support
their governments. In all these ways and more, the countries
directly affected by the Arab Spring differ significantly from the
United States. Nevertheless, the basic point remains valid: if a
country’s leadership cannot rely on the military for complete
and unfailing support of its policies, then the range of policies
its political leaders can pursue is limited by the military and not
by political leadership.
Effective civilian control of the military, therefore, is an
unheralded linchpin of human rights. Just as an actual linchpin
secures a wheel to the axle, civilian control of the military
ensures that the armed forces do not spin off or diverge from
the policies of the elected leadership. Military officers in the
United States take an oath of office to support and defend the
Constitution.9 That oath articulates and embodies the principal
obligations of officers. Without the loyalty commanded by that
oath, the rights of civilians are not fully guaranteed, even
though they may be more or less respected as a matter of policy
or habit. Therefore, civilian control is necessary to: (1) ensure
representative government and consequently almost every other

9. Oath of Office, 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). The oath taken by National Guard
officers also includes support and defense of the state’s constitution and obedience to
its governor. Appointment Oath, 32 U.S.C. § 312 (2006).
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human right; (2) prevent militarization of civil society and the
civilianization of the military; and (3) ensure effective barriers
between the law, norms and privileges of war and those of civil
society.
The 2011 US National Military Strategy provides a crisp
statement of the American tradition of civilian control over the
military and its immediate implications:
We [the Joint Forces] will maintain the trust and confidence
of our elected leaders and the public by providing frank,
professional military advice; being good stewards of public
resources; and vigorously executing lawful orders. The
military’s adherence to the ideals comprised in our
Constitution is a profound example for other nations. We
will continue to affirm the foundational values in our oath:
civilian control of the military remains a core principle of
our Republic and we will preserve it. We will remain an
apolitical institution and sustain this position at all costs.10

Inclusion of this statement represents a welcome change from
the previous National Military Strategy, from which it was
absent.11
To bring the point home, Admiral Michael Mullen, retiring
chairman of the Joint Chiefs, recently explained this principle to
a new generation of officers, notably at the Class of 2011
Commencement ceremony at the US Military Academy at West
Point.
I’m going to ask you to remember that you are citizens first
and foremost. This great republic of ours was founded on
some pretty simple ideas—simple but enduring. And one of
them is that the people, through their elected
representatives, will, as the Constitution stipulates, raise an
army and maintain a navy. The people will determine the
course the military steers, the skills we perfect, the wars we
fight. The people reign supreme. We answer to them. We
10. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2011: REDEFINING AMERICA’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP
16 (2011), available at http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-02/020811084800_
2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf.
11. Compare Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, id., with Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A
Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (2004), available at http://www.jcs.mil//
content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf.
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are therefore—and must remain—a neutral instrument of
the state, accountable to our civilian leaders no matter
which political party holds sway.12

Admiral Mullen’s account is indisputable and notable because
he included it in his valedictory commencement address.13 Why
did he feel compelled to remind the cadets that they remain
citizens and that they must serve as neutral instruments of state?
What factors moved him to speak these most fundamental
concepts as if they were a request? Constitutional law scholars
Diane H. Mazur and Bruce Ackerman provide some answers to
these questions in their recent books.
I. A SEPARATE SPHERE
Diane H. Mazur is one of the rare women who has served as
a military officer and then gone on to teach full-time in an
American law school.14 As a young Air Force captain, she had
served as an aircraft-maintenance and then a munitionsmaintenance officer before attending law school. Following
graduation, she practiced law for a few years and then joined the
faculty of the University of Florida Levin College of Law. Since
the mid-nineties, Mazur has written extensively on civil-military
relations, focusing particularly on issues related to sexual
minorities in the military and the related “Don’t ask, don’t tell”
policy controversies. She has also written a number of policy

12. Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Commencement Address at the US Military Academy (May 21, 2011), available at
http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1598.
13. For other examples of this kind of high-profile reminder, see Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates’ admonition that “[a]s officers, you will have a responsibility
to communicate to those below you that the American military must be non-political,”
which was delivered in graduation speeches at the US Naval Academy (Annapolis) on
May 25, 2007 and the US Air Force Academy (Colorado Springs) on May 30, 2007.
Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., Commencement Address at the US Naval Academy
(May 25, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=
1154; Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., Commencement Address at the US Air Force
Academy (May 30, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1157; see also Admiral Michael Mullen, From the Chairman:
Military Must Stay Apolitical, 50 JOINT FORCES Q. 2, 2 (2008) (reminding the members of
the armed services to remain apolitical in an essay published during the 2008 US
presidential campaign).
14 . See Faculty & Staff: Diane H. Mazur, UNIV. FLA. LEVIN C. L.,
http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/mazur/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
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studies for the Palm Center, a research institute focusing on
gender, sexuality, and the military, where she serves as Legal CoDirector. Her new book, A More Perfect Military: How the
Constitution Can Make Our Military Stronger, brings together a
career’s worth of military, scholarly, and advocacy work into one
powerful argument.
The title of this book plays nicely on the Preamble of the
US Constitution to convey the thesis that “the military is most
healthy when it respects constitutional values.”15 Mazur argues
that “[u]nfortunately, since the end of the Vietnam draft, our
civilian branches of government—the president, Congress, and
the courts—have been trying to distance the military from the
Constitution. They assume that constitutional values get in the
way of military effectiveness, but that’s not true.”16 Mazur sets
out to cut through the cant and “change all the rules that limit
the way we talk about the military.”17 Unlike Bruce Ackerman,
whose work will be discussed below, Mazur does not focus on the
constitutional implications of the strained civil-military
relationship. Recognizing the same general phenomenon,
Ackerman argues that it might lead to some sort of military
intervention or coup in the United States. Mazur goes in a
different direction. She believes that our “confidence that the
military will never engage in a coup against civilian government,
or anything even remotely close to a coup” should not confuse
us into believing that civil-military relations are good.18 Mazur
believes that Congress and especially the judiciary have been too
active, to the detriment of civil-military relations and, ultimately,
to the vibrancy of the armed forces. Mazur’s book argues for
tearing down the wall that segregates the armed forces from the
rest of society. These acts of creative destruction will, she argues,
endow the nation with a more robust force, one more capable of

15. Interview by Michael F. Shaughnessy with Diane H. Mazur, author, TOWARDS A
MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER
(Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://www.educationnews.org/commentaries/
102607.html.
16. Id.
17. DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE CONSTITUTION CAN
MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER 5 (2010).
18. Id. at 13.
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defending the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and
domestic.19
At the heart of Mazur’s book is the claim that over the past
four decades, conservative lawmakers and judges have carved
out a separate sphere for the military. In it, they have promoted
conservative social values without heed to the modern
constitutional protections for individuals. And to insulate the
armed forces from the social progress that has been
transforming civilian society, they have created strong rhetorical
and legal barriers that prevent the questioning of military
choices. To make this argument, Mazur draws widely on recent
American history, including such notable episodes as the
Tailhook Scandal, the formation of the “Don’t ask, don’t tell”
policy, and the abuses at Abu Ghraib.20 But most critically and
innovatively, she examines a strand of the Supreme Court
jurisprudence of William Rehnquist. 21 Mazur argues that
Rehnquist created circumstances in which “military society
could serve as a safe harbor from the usual constitutional
expectations . . . [and] could be used to validate and reinforce
socially conservative viewpoints.” 22 Rehnquist revolutionized
American civil-military relations for the purpose of promoting
his conservative social values.
Mazur’s story opens with Rehnquist as a recent Stanford
Law School graduate clerking for Justice Robert H. Jackson. The
Supreme Court heard Orloff v. Willoughby, a low-profile case
about a doctor challenging the army’s decisions to draft him
under the Doctors’ Draft Act and then not to commission him as
a medical officer, presumably because of his unwillingness to
deny that he was a Communist.23 Orloff had argued that because
he could only be drafted on account of his being a doctor, then
the army must either commission him as a medical officer or
discharge him.
The Supreme Court held otherwise, ruling for the army.
Justice Jackson wrote:
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
45.

See generally id.
See, e.g., id. at 120–26, 146–64, 174–80.
See generally id. at 53–73.
Id. at 88.
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 91 (1953); see MAZUR, supra note 17, at 42–
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We know that from top to bottom of the Army the
complaint is often made, and sometimes with justification,
that there is discrimination, favoritism or other
objectionable handling of men. But judges are not given the
task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up
channels through which such grievances can be considered
and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the
President of the United States and his subordinates. The
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere
with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.24

Mazur agrees with the decision to uphold the army’s authority to
self-regulate and speculates that Rehnquist may have even
drafted this key passage of the decision.25 After all, we know that
young Rehnquist had drafted a memo to Justice Jackson then
considering Brown v. Board of Education that “Plessy v. Ferguson
was right and should be re-affirmed.”26 Clearly he was willing to
share his conservative views with Justice Jackson, intending to
see them written into the court’s opinions. Moreover, he was
“preoccupied with the question of the judiciary’s proper posture
towards the military.”27 In any case, the Korean War-era Orloff
decision took on a life of its own during the more politically
contentious war that followed.
Once on the court himself, Justice Rehnquist sought “to
push the military outside our nation’s constitutional fold and
weaken its connection to civilian courts and civilian law” in a
pair of early cases dealing with some of the day’s most hotly
debated issues.28 In late October 1969, John Flower was ordered

24. Orloff, 343 U.S. at 93–94 (emphasis added) (noting that the military are
governed by military law and military justice—a separate system of order and
discipline—but not that it constitutes a separate society).
25. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 42.
26 . William H. Rehnquist, A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases 2, in
NOMINATION OF JUSTICE WILLIAM HUBBS REHNQUIST: HEARINGS BEFORE THE S. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 99th Cong. 315 (1986), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
congress/senate/judiciary/sh99-1067/browse.html.
27. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 45 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Forward: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1986)).
28. Id.
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off Fort Sam Houston for distributing anti-war flyers.29 Six weeks
later he returned and was arrested for being on an otherwise
open military post and for “distributing handbill invitations for a
‘Town meeting’ on the Vietnam War.” 30 The District Court
convicted Flower of unlawfully entering military property and
sentenced him to six months in prison.31 The Supreme Court
overturned the conviction, holding that “[o]ne who is rightfully
on a street which the state has left open to the public carries
with him there as elsewhere, the constitutional right to express
his views in an orderly fashion.”32 Joined by Chief Justice Warren
Burger, Rehnquist dissented:
Simply because some activities and individuals are allowed
on government property does not require the abandonment
of otherwise allowable restrictions on its use. . . .[T]he
unique requirements of military morale and security may
well necessitate control over certain persons and activities
on the base, even while normal traffic flow through the area
can be tolerated.33

Whereas governmental decisions to limit free speech would
usually be subject to strict scrutiny, Rehnquist would not even
inquire into the legitimacy of those restrictions when applied by
the army. He would not ask for—let alone weigh—their burdens
against the benefits to morale and security. He would defer
unquestioningly to the military’s decision.34
The young justice extended this logic two years later in a
more high-profile equal protection case, Frontiero v. Richardson.35
In this case, Air Force Lieutenant Sharron Frontiero challenged
the military’s policy of giving all married men extra housing and
medical benefits while requiring married women seeking these
29. See Flower v. United States, 452 F.2d 80, 81–82 (5th Cir. 1972), rev’d, 407 U.S.
197 (1972).
30. Id. at 82; MAZUR, supra note 17, at 46.
31. Flower, 452 F.2d at 91. Flower was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1382: “Whoever
reenters or is found [within a military post] after having been removed therefrom or
ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge thereof—Shall
be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.” Id. at
87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Flower, 407 U.S. at 198–99 (quoting Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416
(1943)).
33. Id. at 200–01 (citations omitted).
34. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 47.
35. 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see MAZUR, supra note 17, at 49.
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benefits to prove that their husbands were dependent upon
them.36 In an opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, the
court held that classifications based on sex should be subject to
strict scrutiny. He found that the Air Force’s rationale for this
differential treatment, which rested on “administrative
convenience,” could not stand up to such scrutiny.37 In Justice
Brennan’s trenchant words, there “can be no doubt that
‘administrative convenience’ is not a shibboleth, the mere
recitation of which dictates constitutionality.” 38 Quietly
endorsing the opinion below, Rehnquist dissented from
Brennan’s opinion elevating distinctions based on sex to the
same protected status as race, alienage, and national origin.39 So,
“in determining the constitutionality of the statutory scheme
which plaintiffs attack, [he would merely] ask whether the
classification established in the legislation is reasonable and not
arbitrary and whether there is a rational connection between the
classification and a legitimate governmental end.” 40 Mazur
attributes this position to Rehnquist’s willingness to make
Frontiero prove that the claim of administrative convenience by
the US Department of Defense did not exist.41 Here the record
is very thin;42 perhaps Rehnquist took this position because of an
unwillingness to elevate the level of scrutiny for sex-based
distinctions rather than out of deference to the military.
If Rehnquist spoke sotto voce in Frontiero, he came out
roaring in three landmark cases that followed the end of military
conscription in 1973: Parker v. Levy in 1974, Rostker v. Goldberg in
1981, and Goldman v. Weinberger in 1986. 43 With these three
decisions, Rehnquist led the charge to revolutionize the
relationship between military and civilian society.44 According to
Mazur, his “opinions would build [a] wedge on a foundation of
36. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 680–81; MAZUR, supra note 17, at 48.
37. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688, 690–91.
38. Id. at 690.
39. Id. at 691.
40. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 206 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
41. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 48–49.
42. Rehnquist did not actually draft a dissenting opinion. The syllabus merely
notes that he dissented by simply endorsing “the reasons stated by Judge [Richard]
Rives in his opinion for the District Court.” Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691.
43. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
44. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 55–56.
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four troubling principles” that have come increasingly to define
the civil-military relationship in today’s United States.45
The military should be portrayed as distant, remote, and
separate from civilian society. The more different the
military is from the civilian society it serves, the less
justification there might be for holding the military to the
expectations of civilian law.
The military should be viewed as morally superior to civilian
society and civilian government, and military values should
be elevated above constitutional values. If military values
were morally superior to constitutional values, it would be
much easier to disregard the Constitution when its
protections appeared to conflict with assertions of military
necessity.
Civilians should be encouraged to withdraw from active
participation in civil-military relations and civilian control of
the military and to see themselves as unqualified and
undeserving to question assertions of military necessity.
Service members should be encouraged to resent civilians,
civilian society, and civilian influence over the military.
Judges, courts, and other institutions of law should be
reluctant to insert themselves in legal controversies
involving the military, creating a vacuum that could be filled
by political partisanship and allegiance.46

Mazur argues that all this has come to pass with harmful effects
on the military and the republic. To make this argument, she
offers a provocative account of the Supreme Court decisions.
Rehnquist launched this revolution in Parker v. Levy, which
ought to have been a simple case. In 1966, the “Hawkeye Pierce”
of the Vietnam War, Army Captain Howard Levy, started to tell
lower-ranking personnel that the war was immoral and that
black soldiers were being discriminated against by being “given
all the hazardous duty . . . [and that if he] were a colored soldier
[he] would refuse to go to Viet Nam and . . . refuse to fight.”47
Not surprisingly, Levy was court-martialed and convicted of
conduct unbecoming an officer and for acts that “prejudice . . .

45. Id. at 56.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 57 (citing to Levy’s public statement noted in Parker, 417 U.S. at 737).
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good order and discipline in the armed forces.”48 Nor was it
remarkable that the Supreme Court upheld the convictions,
finding that the charged provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice were neither unconstitutionally vague nor
overbroad.
The important part of the Parker v. Levy story that Mazur
reveals is how Rehnquist misrepresented the earlier Orloff
decision to establish the proposition “that the military should be
seen as distant, remote, and separate from civilian society.”49 To
do so, he mischaracterized Justice Jackson’s dicta discussed
briefly above: “The military constitutes a specialized community
governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian.”50
Jackson had been referring to the military justice system, but
Rehnquist twisted the words to imply that the military was
necessarily a society separate and apart from civilian society.51
He offered what became a self-fulfilling argument. The military
in which Captain Levy served had been highly representative of
American society in general. Soldiers were not relegated to
lifetimes on remote outposts on the frontier as they had been in
the century preceding World War II. Instead, conscripts and
career soldiers lived within American society. And until the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Parker v. Levy in
1974, America’s soldiers generally enjoyed all of the freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment without admonishment
that the exercise of those freedoms was inconsistent with good
order and discipline.52 The Parker decision started a process of
walling the armed forces off from the rest of American society.
In the 1981 case of Rostker v. Goldberg, Justice Rehnquist
found his opportunity to harden the wall he was drawing around
the military. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter responded to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by reinstating the draft
registration. Contrary to the president’s wish to register women
as well, Congress authorized funds sufficient only to register

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Parker, 417 U.S. at 736, 738.
MAZUR, supra note 17, at 59.
Parker, 417 U.S. at 744 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953)).
See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 59; see also Parker, 417 U.S. at 744–45.
See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 60–61.

2012]CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 423
eligible men. 53 The Goldberg plaintiffs complained that the
process violated the equal protection guarantees of men and
women. 54 Mazur explains that the Court should have found
Goldberg a difficult case for introducing heightened deference to
military decision making.55 First, unlike previous cases that had
generally decided the claims of one person or a small number of
people, this case affected all American women between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-six. Second, previous cases involved
review of decisions made by the military; here, Goldberg was
challenging a congressional decision. And third, in previous
cases the Court had decided to defer to the military. In this case,
the military services had requested funds to register women too;
it was Congress that refused to make the authorization.
Nonetheless, Rehnquist wrote that “the Constitution itself
requires . . . deference to congressional choice.”56 Mazur argues
that Rehnquist deferred to the will of Congress over that of the
military on this military personnel issue because Congress was
seeking to implement its view about the proper role for women
in society.57 This is vexing because in the rest of society, the
Court specifically does not defer to discrimination based on sex.
Rather it ruled such distinctions as presumptively unlawful.58
With the ruling in Goldberg, Rehnquist was able to promote a
social agenda that used the military as the means to achieve a
non-military end. When the military wanted to discriminate in
ways that promoted conservative social values, the Rehnquist
Court deferred to the military. When Congress wanted to use
the military to discriminate, Rehnquist would lead the Court to
defer to Congress, even against the Defense Department’s
opposition.
In the final case of this post-draft trilogy, Goldman v.
Weinberger, Rehnquist capped off his wall.59 S. Simcha Goldman
53. See Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (July 2, 1980); see also Doug
Bandow, Draft Registration: The Politics of Institutional Immortality, CATO (Aug. 15, 1994),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-214.html#3a.
54. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59 (1981); see also MAZUR, supra note 17,
at 62.
55. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 64–65.
56. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 67.
57. MAZUR, supra note 17, at 68.
58. See id. at 66.
59. See generally Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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was a clinical psychologist serving as an air force officer. As an
orthodox rabbi, his faith required him to cover his head. After
his superior officer ordered him to remove his yarmulke,
Captain Goldman sued, claiming that this interpretation of the
uniform rule unduly infringed on his right to religious
expression.60 In this decision, Justice Rehnquist summed up his
decades of work.
In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether
military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously
motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the
professional judgment of military authorities concerning
the relative importance of a particular military interest . . . .
Not only are courts “ill-equipped to determine the impact
upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military
authority might have” but the military authorities have been
charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with
carrying out our Nation’s military policy.61

The air force did not have to explain its policy, let alone
justify it. Nor was this a question of deference to congressional
will; the air force had simply issued and interpreted its own
regulation without the notice and comment that other
governmental agencies must undergo prior to issuing
regulations. Captain Goldman had either to remove his
yarmulke or leave the service just as every other orthodox Jew
and Sikh in the service would have to do. Rehnquist’s revolution
was complete. No longer would the personnel policies of the
armed forces of the United States be subjected to any
meaningful constitutional review. He had separated military
society from civil society and from constitutionally protected
rights. Mazur argues that in this separate sphere, conservatives
proceeded to institutionalize their prejudices about
homosexuals, 62 women, 63 religious minorities, 64 and even law
60. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504–05 (quoting the Air Force regulation, AFR 35-10,
¶ 1-6.h(2)(f) (1980), which said that “headgear will not be worn . . . [w]hile indoors
except by armed security police in the performance of their duties”); MAZUR, supra
note 17, at 69–72.
61. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507–08 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
62. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 146–54.
63. See id. at 165–80.
64. See id. at 69–73.
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students 65 in ways that make the military less strong 66 and
America less equitable.
Separate is seldom equal. As noted above, Mazur’s work
strongly emphasizes the role that Justice Rehnquist and the
Supreme Court played in the separation of military personnel
from American society. 67 Having established that claim, she
moves on to argue that Rehnquist’s views about the separate
nature of the armed services—while not necessarily accurate
when he penned them—became self-fulfilling.68 Ten years after
the Goldman decision, a former vice chief of naval operations
observed, “the armed forces are no longer representative of the
people they serve. More and more, enlisted [men and women]
as well as officers are beginning to feel that they are special,
better than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an
65. See id. at 6–9. Mazur explains that ROTC programs left many university
campuses because they would not comply with academic standards and because the
end of the selective service made ROTC less popular, not, as was commonly held,
because of any hostility on the part of elite universities. The inaccurate but prevailing
story fed an unwarranted sense that military people were unwelcome in wider society.
Id. Similarly, she argues that Congress’ threats to cut funding to higher education
institutions that prohibit ROTC or prevent or military recruitment on campus,
otherwise known as the Solomon Amendment controversies, unnecessarily exacerbated
a minor issue. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR), 547
U.S. 47, 51–53 (2006). The military should not have discriminated against homosexuals
in service. Law schools should not have banned military recruiters. Congress should not
have retaliated with the Solomon Amendment threatening to cut off all government
support of the universities. And law professors should have realized that their case to
overturn the Solomon Amendment would not succeed because the Supreme Court
would view it as a military personnel issue, not a free speech issue. See generally Rumsfeld,
547 U.S. 47. Mazur argues that the ROTC and the Solomon Amendment controversies
arose because the Supreme Court had deprived members of the armed forces of
freedoms enjoyed by a more tolerant civil society. See generally MAZUR, supra note 17,
ch. 1.
66. See generally MAZUR, supra note 17, at ch. 8. Mazur ascribes one important
facet of the military’s fragility as arising out its unwillingness to draw from a broader
swath of society, posing significant constraints on its ability to recruit and retain
suitable candidates. As one result of this situation, she argue, the military ends up
overpaying enlisted personnel. See id. at 140–43. Even so, the services are taking in a
declining rate of high-school graduates and an increasing number of recruits requiring
“moral waivers” on account of their records of felony and serious misdemeanor
convictions. The services have had to issue thousands of these waivers, including for
persons convicted of “aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, and in a few cases, for
making terrorist threats.” Id. at 138–39. The services have also been recruiting more
former gang members. See id. at 139–40.
67. See, e.g., id. at 89–91; see also supra notes 20–57 and accompanying text.
68. See id. at 90. See generally id. at ch.6.
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armed force serving a democracy.”69 This sense of superiority
reached something like a crisis level in the late 1990s. Since the
war in Afghanistan started in late 2001, the crisis has greatly
dissipated, even if the sense of separation and superiority has
not. Mazur argues that this separate sphere gives the
government innumerable opportunities for mischief, and space
in which to employ questionable policies, most notably in the
detention, interrogation, and trial of person considered
dangerous in the so-called “War on Terror.” 70 As will be
discussed below, Bruce Ackerman argues that a constitutional
crisis may yet reemerge with even more far-reaching
consequences.71
The “military is the most respected and trusted institution,
public or private, 72 within our society,” 73 and our elected
representatives are not. Ackerman and Mazur explore some of
the implications. Mazur argues that this fact may explain
support for military detention and trials of accused terrorists.
And Ackerman speculates that it may put the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs in the position of deciding to end a contested

69. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 77 (quoting Stanley R. Arthur, The American
Military: Some Thoughts on Who We Are and What We Are, in CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
AND THE NOT-QUITE WARS OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 15 (Vincent Davis ed., 1996)).
70. See MAZUR, supra note 17, ch. 7.
71. See infra Part III.
72. See, e.g., Donna Miles, Military Takes Top U.S. Confidence Rankings, AM. FORCES
PRESS SERVICE (June 28, 2011), http://www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?ID=641. The
Department of Defense reports these findings proudly and without editorial comment
on the Chairman’s webpage:
Forty-seven percent said they have a “great deal” of confidence in the
military, the highest rating, and 31 percent reported “quite a lot” of
confidence. That [total] rating [of 78%] was 14 percent higher than for the
second-ranking institution, small business, and 22 percent higher than for the
third-ranking institution, the police. Other organizations rankings, in
descending order of high confidence, were: organized religion, 48 percent;
the medical system, 39 percent; the U.S. Supreme Court, 37 percent; the
presidency, 35 percent; the public schools, 34 percent; the criminal justice
system, 28 percent; newspapers, 28 percent; television news, 27 percent;
banks, 23 percent; organized labor, 21 percent; big business, 19 percent; and
health maintenance organizations, 19 percent. Congress received the lowest
high-confidence ranking, at 12 percent.
Id.
73. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 3–4 (citing Frank Newport, Americans’ Confidence
in Congress at All-Time Low, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, June 21, 2007,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/27946/americans-confidence-congress-alltime-low.aspx.
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election and placing the Republican candidate in the White
House.
II. THE SOLDIER AND THE REPUBLIC
Let us turn now to a more wide-ranging book, which also
inquires how the people of the United States relate to the
military sworn to support and defend their Constitution. In
Mazur’s piece, the military is framed as playing an oddly passive
role in a campaign by social conservatives to carve out a separate
sphere. Bruce Ackerman’s book posits that military leaders play
a more active role in reshaping the American political order. His
account ascribes to the armed forces a role that is less central to
the narrative, but more decisive in the outcome. Ackerman is a
Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University,
one of Yale’s most distinguished chairs. He earned this honor in
great part because of his prolific record of high-impact
scholarship, having written dozens of books and articles on
economic and civil rights, constitutionalism, and jurisprudence,
and more recently on national security. 74 Drawing on this
extensive background, Ackerman delivered the prestigious 2010
Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University and
later published these lectures as The Decline and Fall of the
American Republic.75
The book’s title, of course, echoes the tropes made famous
by the works of two British historians: The History of the Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire, the eighteenth-century classic by
Edward Gibbon, and the “Rise and Fall” discourse so famously
articulated by Ackerman’s colleague at Yale, historian Paul
Kennedy. 76 Both historical discourses are sophisticated,
nuanced, and ultimately pessimistic: ending with a fall. Gibbon’s
classic attributed the decline and fall of the Roman Empire to its
74 . See Bruce Ackerman, YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/
BAckerman.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
75 . BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2010).
76. See 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE (J.B. Bury ed., Fred de Fau & Co. 1906) (1789); PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE
AND FALL OF BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY (Ashfield Press 1986) (1976) [hereinafter
KENNEDY, BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY]; see also PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000
(Vintage Books 1989) (1987) [hereinafter KENNEDY, GREAT POWERS].
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decadent civil society and poor leadership, which off-loaded
responsibility for the defense of the realm to mercenaries:
That public virtue which among the ancients was
denominated patriotism, is derived from a strong sense of
our own interest in the preservation and prosperity of the
free government of which we are members. Such a
sentiment, which had rendered the legions of the republic
almost invincible, could make but a very feeble impression
on the mercenary servants of a despotic prince; and it
became necessary to supply that defect by other motives, of
a different, but not less forcible nature, honour and
religion.77

The mercenaries eventually turned on Rome, Gibbon explained,
destroying the world’s greatest power and condemning Europe
to centuries of darkness. While drawn from immense
scholarship, Gibbon’s history was also shaped by the urgent
issues of the time in which it was written. At this time the
American Revolution raged and London relied increasingly on
Hessian mercenaries in the long struggle to retain the North
American colonies.78 To some extent, Gibbon’s history of Rome
naturally reflected his views on the state of the British Empire as
well.
Two hundred years later, Britain had lost a second empire.
Born in 1945 and writing some forty years after that, British-born
historian Paul Kennedy posited that great empires eventually
overreach and consequently collapse under the unbearable
combined weight of far-flung military obligations and
unsustainable domestic consumption. 79 For Kennedy, as for
Gibbon, the responsibility for a great power’s decline typically
lies in ill-considered grand strategy, or, more specifically,
because a society’s leaders fail to make tough choices necessary

77. GIBBON, supra note 76, at 10.
78. See Harold E. Selesky, Colonial America, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON
WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 79, 80 (Michael Howard, George Andreopoulos &
Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994).
79. See KENNEDY, BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY, supra note 76, at 347–49 (attributing
the decline of the British Empire to its having “numerous defence burdens and
obligations, without the corresponding capacity to sustain them”); KENNEDY, GREAT
POWERS, supra note 76, at 44–55 (accrediting the decline of the Hapsburg Empire to
increasing military costs, over-extension of the military, and failure to preserve the
domestic economy).
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for allocating resources to sustain vital institutions.80 “Rise and
Fall” studies inevitably pair the vigor of societies with the extent
to which their leaders’ decisions are virtuous. These studies
exhibit an essentially historicist way of explaining the world,
focusing on where things went wrong and how conscious (and
contingent) human decisions shaped destiny. Many other
scholars would attribute national or imperial decline to
exogenous factors, such as ill-tempered gods, uncontrollable
plagues, drinking water pipes made of deadly lead, or foreign
invaders led by generals of unique genius.81 But for members of
the “School of Decline,” the fault lies not in our starts but in
ourselves.
Applying this formula to examine the troubles of today’s
great power, 82 Ackerman argues that the United States has
started its decline, and that it will fall. Whereas for Kennedy, the
word “fall” signifies a relative loss of economic and military
power, for Ackerman it means a loss of a republic’s virtue—the
demise of the very characteristic that defines the society, gives it
integrity, and makes it strong. Ackerman grimly predicts in one
breathless paragraph:
(1) [T]he evolving system of presidential nominations will
lead to the election of an increasing number of charismatic
outsider types who gain office by mobilizing activist support
for extremist programs of the left or right; (2) all
presidents, whether extremist or mainstream, will rely on
media consultants to design streams of sound bites aimed at
narrowly segmented micropublics, generating a politics of
unreason that will often dominate public debate; (3) they
80. See KENNEDY, BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY, supra note 76, at xiv–xvii; KENNEDY,
GREAT POWERS, supra note 76, at xv, 539–40.
81. See, e.g., Sergio Sabbanti & Sirio Fiorino, The Antonine Plague and the Decline of
the Roman Empire, 17 INFEZ MED 261 (2009) (discussing the plague’s impact on the
Roman Empire); SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 89–90 (Marcus Dods trans.,
2009) (attributing decline to gods). See generally PETER HEATHER, THE FALL OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE: A NEW HISTORY (2005) (attributing decline to barbarian invasions); A.
TREVOR HODGE, ROMAN AQUEDUCTS & WATER SUPPLY (2002) (discussing water supply
in the Roman Empire).
82. For more on the “decline school,” see Robert D. Schulzinger, Complaints, SelfJustifications, and Analysis: The Historiography of American Relations since 1996, in AMERICA
IN THE WORLD: THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1941, at
395, 421–23; and see Peter Schmeisser, Taking Stock: Is America in Decline?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Apr. 17, 1988, at 24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/17/
magazine/taking-stock-is-america-in-decline.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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will increasingly govern through their White House staff of
superloyalists, issuing executive orders that their staffers will
impose on the federal bureaucracy even when they conflict
with congressional mandates; (4) they will engage with an
increasingly politicized military in ways that may greatly
expand their effective power to put their executive orders
into force throughout the nation; (5) they will legitimate
their unilateral actions through an expansive use of
emergency powers, and (6) assert “mandates from the
People” to evade or ignore congressional statutes when
public opinion polls support decisive action; (7) they will
rely on elite lawyers in the executive branch to write up
learned opinions that vindicate the constitutionality of their
most blatant power grabs. These opinions will publicly
rubber-stamp presidential actions months or years before
the Supreme Court gets into the act . . . [w]ith . . . the
president’s media machine generating a groundswell of
support for his power grab, the Supreme Court may find it
prudent to stage a strategic retreat, allowing the president to
displace Congress and use his bureaucracy and military
authority to establish a new regime of law and order.83

This is his outline and argument. In short, Ackerman predicts
an executive coup made possible by a politicized and antidemocratic military.
While he assembles an argument that explains some serious
problems, his conclusions sometimes seem over-reaching.
Ackerman reads widely and frequently spots subterranean
trends before others; but in this instance he may have overlearned the lessons from his principle case study. Ackerman
rests his argument on the lessons he draws from three recent
crises in the recent American constitutional experience:
Watergate, Iran-Contra, and the so-called “War on Terror.” And
while Ackerman refers to the Watergate and Iran-Contra
episodes throughout this book, it appears that he would not
have written it absent the outrageous “Torture Memos” issued
by the US Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel in the
summer of 2002.84 Ackerman hangs his argument on the claim
83. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 9–10.
84. See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (compiling the legal memoranda that appear
to justify torture and other cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of detainees).
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that the “‘torture memos’ do not represent a momentary
aberration but a symptom of deep structural pathologies that
portend worse abuses in the future.”85
With the “Torture Memos” as his principal source of
inspiration, Ackerman ascribes the loss of republican values to
the “transformation of the White House into a platform for
charismatic extremism and bureaucratic lawlessness.” 86
Ackerman does not foresee a decline in the nation’s morality or
its democratic processes. He expects America to continue to
develop into a more moral nation and to continue to hold
regular elections. He does, however, predict that the dulyelected presidents will govern radically and without adequate
checks from Congress or the judiciary.87 In Ackerman’s dark
interpretation of the emerging “administrative Presidency,” the
United States will come to be governed through a largely
unaccountable executive branch.88 Presidents will set policy by
edict and implement it through the burgeoning White House
staff rather than through the executive departments or agencies.
These untethered presidents will determine policy on their own
or through czars who have not faced the confirmation process.
They will establish the policies through decrees, executive
85. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 95. Trevor Morrison, who served as an associate
White House counsel to President Obama, takes on this claim directly as part of his
review, arguing that Ackerman misconstrues institutional realities that generally do
constrain executive behavior. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1693 (2011) (book review) (“[Ackerman’s] account of the current
state of affairs is too often oversimplified or false, its attraction to institutional
innovation too often blind to the workaday needs of government and insensitive to the
costs of change. Ultimately, the book deals too little with the reality of executive
constitutionalism to offer a credible appraisal of its performance or to propose serious
ideas for its reform.”).
86. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 11.
87. Id. at 40.
88. Ackerman cites extensively to the writings of Elena Kagan, who pointedly
describes this emerging phenomenon as the “administrative Presidency.” See id. at 36–
38. Ackerman notes that Kagan played a key role in developing this form of governance
while serving in the White House under President Bill Clinton. See id. As a professor at
Harvard Law School, she became one of its leading theorists. Kagan’s most notable
scholarly work acknowledged the dangers of this shift: “lawlessness—that Presidents,
more than agency officials acting independently, tend to push the envelope when
interpreting statutes.” Id. at 37 (quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2249 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, Ackerman
also notes that Kagan concluded that the disadvantages of this lawlessness “are
outweighed by the “president’s unique claims to democratic legitimacy.” Id.
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orders,
executive
agreements,
administrative
rules,
interpretations, or signing statements. “Superloyalist” lawyers in
the Offices of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department or the
White House Counsel will provide self-proving legal support for
these policies. Pollsters and spin masters will hone the public
messages. Thousands of political appointees will implement
them. 89 The presidents will enjoy the tacit consent of a
fragmented Congress and an excessively deferential judiciary.
And, in each of Ackerman’s scenarios, the military plays a
critical role. In the direst of these, “the military will operate as a
power behind the throne.”90
One of Ackerman’s most compelling concerns is the
increasingly politicized and autonomous military.91 This threepart argument notes that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs has
become an unelected political force of its own. Second, this
“military colonization” over national security decision making
has been enhanced by the ever-increasing number of officers
and retired officers gaining civilian appointments. Finally—and
possibly fatally—these two phenomena have been significantly
aggravated because military professionals have become far more
political and partisan. In short, Ackerman posits that the officer
corps, who over time have increasingly identified with the
Republican party, may resolve some future political crisis by
handing the presidency to the Republican candidate on the
basis that to do so would prevent a security catastrophe.92
First, Ackerman explains that since the passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs has enjoyed an
increasingly autonomous and powerful status as the unified
voice of the armed forces.93 Charismatic chairmen, such as Colin
Powell and Michael Mullen, have been able to pursue policy
89. Ackerman points out that President John F. Kennedy had 196 high level
positions to fill, each requiring US Senate confirmation. President Clinton had 786,
and President George W. Bush had 1141. When combined with the key posts that do
not require confirmation, the current president can make some 3000 key
appointments. Id. at 34.
90. Id. at 11.
91. See generally id. ch. 2.
92. Id. at 61–62, 78–79.
93. Id. at 49; see Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986, 10 U.S.C. §§ 151–56 (2006).
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objectives by appealing directly to the public, to House or
Senate leadership, and the executive. Doing this, they have
sometimes outmaneuvered their civilian defense secretaries and
even presidents in contests to shape military policy. 94 Most
notably, Ackerman explains that General Powell foisted on
President Clinton his eponymous doctrine, limiting
interventions to circumstances in which the United States could
exert overwhelming force.95
Second, Ackerman argues that career officers have
colonized the key positions of nominally civilian leadership of
military and paramilitary institutions, in the Department of
Defense, the National Security Council (“NSC”), and the
Intelligence Community. Prior to 1980, the civilian leadership
within the Department of Defense was overwhelmingly nonmilitary; only seventeen percent had as much as five years of
military service. 96 Since 1980, the numbers have changed
considerably. Nearly a quarter have had fifteen years of service,
and forty-four percent had five years. 97 Why is this shift
problematic? First, having spent so much time in military
careers, they are imbued with military culture and military views.
These are not wrong or inferior, but they are frequently
different from the civilian perspectives that are supposed to be
informing their work in civilian billets. Likewise, those with a
military background may have bureaucratic advantages—for
instance in communicating with people in uniform in ways that
enable them to connect better—that give them a bureaucraticoperational advantage over true civilians, particularly in an era
where the civilian appointments turn over so rapidly and take so
long to fill.98

94. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 49–56.
95. See id. at 51, 56 .
96. Id. at 56–57.
97. Id. at 57.
98. According to the most recent data available, the average political appointee
faces a confirmation process that takes eight-and-a-half months and then serves only
eleven to twenty months. CHERYL Y. MARKUM ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RES. INST.,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS: POSITIONS AND PROCESS xi (2001).
Ackerman notes that between 1979 and 2003, positions requiring Senate confirmation
were vacant some twenty-five percent of the time. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 157
(citing Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82.
S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 962–63 (2009)).
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Ackerman also notes with concern the significant increase
in the incidence of military professionals leading non-military
institutions such as the NSC and intelligence agencies.99 For four
decades following the establishment of the post in 1947, civilians
served as national security advisor. Particularly in the years
following President Kennedy’s appointment of McGeorge
Bundy, heavyweights such as Walt W. Rostow, Henry Kissinger,
and Zbigniew Brzezinski provided meaningful civilian control of
the national security establishment. Ackerman further asserts
that Ronald Reagan’s unfortunate appointments of Marine
Colonel Robert “Bud” McFarlane and Vice Admiral John
Poindexter resulted in the Iran-Contra scandal. He cites Ivo
Daalder and I.M. Destler who note that Reagan’s preferred
choice, James A. Baker, would probably have exercised the
common sense and the administrative skill needed to avoid the
fiasco.100 Even after the scandal threatened to bring down his
administration, Reagan turned to another officer, Colin Powell,
and, likewise, George H.W. Bush appointed Army Lieutenant
General Brent Scowcroft. The trend has only continued to
intensify, as presidents have since appointed career officers to
chair the NSC,101 to key posts in the CIA,102 and, more recently,
to serve as directors of national intelligence.103 Ackerman makes
this point powerfully:

99. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 57–58.
100. See id. at 57 (citing IVO DAALDER & I.M. DESTLER, IN THE SHADOW OF THE
OVAL OFFICE: PROFILES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS AND THE PRESIDENTS
THEY SERVED—FROM JFK TO GEORGE W. BUSH 148–49 (2009)).
101. Ackerman may be overstating his case as far as the office of the National
Security Advisor. Brent Scowcroft was the last military appointee for sixteen years, as
neither Presidents Clinton nor George W. Bush appointed officers or former officers.
President Obama’s first appointee, retired Marine general James L. Jones, lasted well
less than two years and was replaced by a civilian lawyer with no military background,
Thomas E. Donilon. See id. at 57–58.
102. Both Presidents George W. Bush and Obama appointed two directors of the
Central Intelligence Agency; notably each appointed one civilian and one active-duty
general. President George W. Bush appointed civilian Porter Goss and General Michael
Hayden, US Air Force (Ret.), while President Obama appointed civilian Leon Panetta
and General David Petraeus, US Army (Ret.).
103 . The directors of national intelligence have been: Ambassador John
Negroponte (Apr. 21, 2005–Feb. 13, 2007), Vice Admiral John Michael McConnell, US
Navy (Ret.) (Feb. 13, 2007–Jan. 27, 2009), Admiral Dennis C. Blair, US Navy (Ret.)
(Jan. 28, 2009–May 28, 2010), David C. Gompert (a Naval Academy graduate and longtime civilian employee of the Department of Defense, Acting, May 28, 2010–Aug. 5,
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A similar pattern prevails at the Defense Department. Its
recent decision to create an undersecretary of defense for
intelligence is a big deal—the new office ranks just behind
the reliably civilian undersecretary [sic] in the department’s
pecking order. But only the first incumbent was a civilian
[Stephen Cambone], and he has been followed by a retired
three-star general [James Clapper, US Air Force]. If this
military turn continues, the undersecretary will not function
as a civilian check on the enormous intelligence operations
run by the department’s Defense Intelligence Agency or its
National Security Agency—both under the leadership of
active-duty three-stars. He will be looking at the world
through the same professional prisms as his subordinates.
When he leaves the Pentagon to talk with the president’s
new director of national intelligence [Admiral Dennis
Blair], the conversation will continue in the same vein—so
long as the director is a military man, one retired three-star
general will be talking to another retired three-star. And if
they get together to give the president advice, he
undoubtedly will want to hear the opinion of his four-star
national security advisor [Retired Marine Corps General
James L. Jones].104

Ackerman’s point here is very important: the nation does
not have meaningful civilian control over the military
intelligence apparatus if its civilian leaders are retired
generals. 105 Even though the overwhelming majority of
intelligence activities, personnel, and funding are military, the
intelligence process remains an inherently political activity and
therefore needs civilian input. 106 Relying on a relatively
homogeneous military community to lead intelligence activities
deprives decision makers of other valuable perspectives.

2010), and Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, US Air Force (Ret.) (Aug. 5, 2010–
present).
104. Id., at 58–59 (citations omitted). The “sic” indicates that the Under Secretary
for Intelligence follows in succession order to the reliably civilian Deputy Secretary (not
“undersecretary”).
105. See id. at 59.
106 . See Robert Jervis, What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Process?, 1 INT’L J.
INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 28, 39–41 (1986); see also, e.g., Mark R.
Shulman, The Rise and Fall of American Naval Intelligence, 1882-1917, 8 INTELLIGENCE &
NAT’L SEC. 214 (1993) (providing a historical perspective on the politicization of the
collection and analysis work of the Office of Naval Intelligence).
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Ackerman’s snapshot may not be quite as predictive as he
fears. In the year since Ackerman wrote this passage, President
Obama has appointed civilians to succeed military men in the
positions of under secretary of defense for intelligence (Michael
Vickers) and national security advisor (Thomas E. Donilon).107
Today, only one of the top fifteen people on the NSC staff has
significant
military
experience.
Moreover,
command
responsibilities continue to require that the directors of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency
are general officers, indicating that Congress has deemed
appointment of officers to these positions as necessary for the
agencies’ success. 108 Likewise, Ackerman found “fourteen of
twenty-nine key positions” in the Obama Defense Department
were held by retired officers.109 My own survey (approximately a
year later) finds fifteen of ninety-two appointments at the level
of deputy assistant secretary or above were held by retired
military. Of these fifteen retired officers, more than half direct
units administering personnel or military community and family
affairs (including reserve and prisoner of war affairs), for which
the leadership of veterans seems uniquely appropriate. Likewise,
the service departments of the army, navy, and air force do have
a higher proportion of senior administrators with significant
military experience, which also makes good sense given their
mission to organize, train, and equip military personnel. On the
other hand, citizens dominate in the Department of Defense’s
strategy and policy positions.
107. Under Secretary Vickers did have some military experience early in his
career, but he quickly moved to the Central Intelligence Agency and then other civilian
positions. Moreover, the president traditionally does not appoint civilians to some of
these positions. The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency is a general officer,
with duties to serve as military intelligence advisor to the secretary and the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs and to command the Joint Functional Component Command for
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 50 U.S.C. § 403-5(b)(5) (2006); see also
About DIA, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, http://www.dia.mil/about/ (last updated
Jan. 6, 2012). Likewise, Congress requires that the director of the National Security
Agency be recommended jointly by the secretary of defense and the director of
national intelligence before being appointed by the president. 10 U.S.C. § 201 (2006 &
Supp. 2009). He also serves as commander of the US Cyber Command. Apparently, his
deputy is always a civilian. See Who Is the Head of NSA/CSS?, Frequently Asked Questions
About NSA, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY-CENT. SEC. SERVICE, http://www.nsa.gov/about/faqs/
about_nsa.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
108. 10 U.S.C. § 201.
109. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 162.
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Over the past several decades, in addition to taking on new
and more politically oriented roles in the government,
individual officers have become more politicized and partisan.
First of all, they vote. Prior to World War II, “[t]he
overwhelming majority of officers even refused to vote, since it
required them to think of themselves as partisans for the time it
took to cast a secret ballot.”110 By 1944, however, a quarter of
senior officers voted in the presidential election.111 Since then,
political participation became common. The Reagan Revolution
brought another dramatic change. In the late seventies, over
half of all higher ranking officers identified themselves as
political independents and only a third as Republicans.112 In
1984, over half self-identified as Republicans, a portion that rose
to two-thirds in 1996—at which point only seven percent were
Democrats. 113 Mazur also notes the increasing levels of
partisanship, citing as support a statement made by a West Point
professor and a speech given by Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates at the Air Force and Naval Academy graduations in
2007.114 And because the current officer corps is also more likely
than not to believe it acceptable to advocate publicly for specific
military policies,115 civilian control is weakened—particularly if
the civilian is a Democrat.
Ackerman discusses possible implications having an officer
corps that overwhelmingly favors one party over another. Here
110. Id. at 61.
111. Id. (referring to colonels and general officers).
112 . Id. (citing that fifty five percent of higher ranking officers identified
themselves as independents in 1976, while thirty three percent identified as
Republican).
113. Id. Reading the same materials, Mazur notes that the author of the survey
believed that his data “may have understated the size of the partisan divide.” MAZUR,
supra note 17, at 86.
114. See MAZUR, supra note 17, at 83. Ackerman cites a survey taken at West Point.
Ackerman, supra note 75, at 62.
115. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 62 (citing Ole R. Holsti, Of Chasms and
Convergences, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAPS AND AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY 15, 19-21 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001)
(reporting on survey conducted by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies); James A.
David, Attitudes and Opinions Among Senior Military Officers and a U.S. Cross-Section, 199899, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAPS AND AMERICAN NATIONAL
SECURITY 120 (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001)) (“[Sixty-five] percent of
senior officers think it is OK to go public and advocate military policies they ‘believe
are in the best interests of the United States . . . .’”).
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he echoes Gibbon’s account of the fall of Rome. He identifies
several hypothetical scenarios in which the constitutional order
faces critical but not unthinkable challenges. One scenario
involves highly contested election à la Bush v. Gore in which the
Supreme Court demurs to decide this “political question,” even
as the crisis continues past inauguration day (much as it
threatened to do in 1876–77 and again in 2000).116 Finally, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs steps in and “calls a halt to these
shenanigans in the name of national security.”117 He declares
the Republican to be the winner, based on his reading of polling
data (not based on votes in the Electoral College) through
which he finds the Republican candidate to be more popular.
Ackerman does not seem as exorcised by this hypothetical
intervention itself as he is by the dangerous precedent it sets for
further military meddling in the constitutional order. 118 His
other hypotheticals also involve some form of military
participation in their resolution.119
After painting the lurid crises that impend, Ackerman
proposes a variety of clever institutional solutions to ensure that
the White House and the military reconnect more faithfully with
the constitutional order that has sustained the republic for over
two centuries. First, he proposes a raft of arrangements to
improve the functioning of the democratic process. To reduce
the likelihood of electing demagogues to the presidency, he
revives his proposal for a national “Deliberation Day.” 120 To
ensure that serious journalists continue to perform watchdog
functions, he would create the “Internet news voucher” and a
“National Endowment for Journalism.”121 And to avoid another
contested electoral crisis, Ackerman supports the Popular
Sovereignty Initiative, an interstate pact in which states commit

116. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 76–78; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
117. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 79.
118. Id. at 78–79.
119. See Ackerman discusses two additional scenarios as well: “The Extremist
Scenario” and “The Crisis Scenario.” See id. at 79–81, 81–83.
120 . See id. at 127–31. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN,
DELIBERATION DAY (2004).
121. See ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 133 (giving shared credit to his colleague
Ian Ayres for the idea of the “Internet news voucher”).
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their Electoral College votes to whichever candidate earns the
most popular votes.122
Then Ackerman offers a more radical set of organizational
adjustments intended to halt the march of the “institutional
presidency” and restore the rule of law. First, Ackerman would
establish a Supreme Executive Tribunal composed of nine
judges appointed to long staggered terms and subject to US
Senate confirmation. 123 This tribunal would review the legal
opinions made by the White House counsel and the Office of
Legal Counsel in an effort to hammer out consensual positions
on questions related to executive authority.124 As part of a grand
bargain rejiggering the separation of powers among the
branches of government, Ackerman would also reform the
Senate’s filibuster rules to ensure that appointments receive up
or down votes.125
Among Ackerman’s many reforms, and most important for
our purposes, is the proposal to draft and adopt a new Canon of
Military Ethics, aimed at reinvigorating the principle of civilian
control.126 Ackerman hopes that a presidential commission on
civil-military relations would undertake several years of study to
shape a realistic code of conduct. Once drafted, Congress would
enact it or the president could order it put into effect.127 As
creative and thorough as Ackerman is, this proposal seems
facile. The principle of civilian control of the military is clearly
important and relatively noncontroversial as far as principles go,
but what does it mean? Ackerman punts this question to the
presidential commission.
To support this change in culture, Ackerman does,
however, offer a few more concrete proposals. He would
implement a new emergency powers law that requires increased
levels of congressional support as security crises continue.128 He
would amend the Goldwater-Nichols legislation so that the
122. See id. at 136–37.
123. See id. at 143.
124. See id. at 143–46.
125. See id. at 158–59.
126. See id. at 159–60.
127. See id. at 160–61.
128. See id. at 168–74. Here Ackerman reprises his 2006 book, Before the Next
Attack. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006).
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chairman of the Joint Chiefs no longer has a statutory seat on
the NSC; he or she would attend meetings only at the invitation
of the secretary of defense or the president.129 Ackerman would
extend civilian experience requirements beyond the top
echelons of the Defense Department. Currently, the secretary
and deputy secretary of defense must spend, respectively, ten
and seven years as civilians before they can be appointed.130 The
service secretaries must spend at least five years as civilians.131
The under secretary of defense for policy must also come from
civilian life, although no specific time requirement is imposed.132
Ackerman would extend this mechanism more broadly within
the Department of Defense and to the national security advisor
and director of national intelligence.
While I applaud the effort to encourage presidents to reach
beyond the military to find their civilian leaders, this particular
fix seems somewhat ill-fitting. After twenty or thirty in the
military, individuals are not likely to dramatically change their
mindsets by spending five years working for a defense contractor
or doing defense related work in academia. And if they have
been working in a field completely unrelated to the military,
their relevant skills and interest in military affairs may have
diminished significantly. At the risk of being one of those
reviewers who writes about what he would include in the book
rather than take the author’s argument seriously, I wish that
Ackerman had instead focused some attention on influential
educational and civic institutions and what they could do to
educate future military and civilian leaders to make wiser
decisions.133 As these institutions invest more in this kind of
education, their graduates seem more likely to receive
leadership appointments—and to fulfill their roles wisely.

129. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 163–64.
130. 10 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 132(a) (2006) (applying to the secretary of defense and
deputy secretary, respectively).
131. 10 U.S.C. §§ 8013(a)(2), 3013(a)(2), 5013(a)(2) (2006) (referring to the Air
Force, Army, and Navy, respectively).
132. 10 U.S.C. §§ 134(a), 135(a), 136(a) (2006).
133. See, e.g., David Burt, Faculty Approve New ROTC Resolutions, YALE DAILY NEWS,
May 5, 2011, http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2011/may/05/faculty-approve-newrotc-resolutions/; The Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy and Studies in Grand
Strategy Graduate Seminar, YALE UNIV., http://iss.yale.edu/brady-johnson-programgrand-strategy-and-studies-grand-strategy-graduate-seminar (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
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III. WHAT KIND OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP DO WE
WANT?
These two important books raise troubling questions about
the relationship between America’s armed forces and wider
society. Both point to the isolation of the military and discuss
the significant risks that isolation creates, but neither goes far
enough in examining what we should expect from that
relationship. In general terms, the wish list has not changed in
decades. First, military officers should do what they are directed
to do by the national command authority in legitimate pursuit
of national security and related objectives. Second, military
personnel should act publicly in a politically neutral way. Third,
the armed forces should be reasonably equipped and adequately
trained to complete their assigned tasks. And fourth, their
leaders should provide civilian leadership with the information
needed to administer effective and meaningful command.
These axioms remain valid as far as they go, but, as Mazur and
Ackerman observe, much else has changed. Mazur focuses on
the military culture, which has evolved dramatically since the
end of the draft, mostly in ways that further removed it from
wider society. Ackerman focuses on changes in the
constitutional order—in our polity—that portend for the
military a new role as power broker. Both authors offer some
laudable suggestions for how to improve the relationship
between the military and civil society.
The end of the draft and the rise of the modern militaryindustry inevitably changed the range of possibilities for civilmilitary relations. A generation of a volunteer military has
supplanted the nation’s long history of, and attachment to,
citizen soldiers. The implications of this change for the nation
are myriad. For example, the military is composed of a less
representative sample of Americans. In contrast, American
society is composed of an ever smaller portion of people with
military experience. This has led to a growing gap in
understanding between the military and civil sectors. Likewise,
fewer of our elected leaders have military service experience,
which would give them personal insight into war and the
military, and the credibility to make decisions contrary to the
advice of military professionals.
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Half a century ago, outgoing President Dwight D.
Eisenhower presciently warned against the distractions imposed
by the military-industrial complex on the “diligent in pursuit of
the Nation’s great goals.”134
In the councils of government, we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential
for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger
our liberties or democratic processes. We should take
nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable
citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge
industrial and military machinery of defense with our
peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may
prosper together.135

Despite Eisenhower’s admonitions, the cluster of interests
representing members of Congress and their financial
supporters, the military services, universities and think-tanks,
and the defense industries has dramatically reshaped the
nation’s political, research, economic, and strategic landscapes.
And I see no way to unravel that complex as long as the military
needs specialized weapons, logistics, and communications
systems. Therefore, we need more sophisticated tools and
theories for controlling them and managing the conflicts of
interest.
Yes, domestic factors and the choices leaders make do
matter a great deal. In the tradition of historians Edward
Gibbon and Paul Kennedy, Bruce Ackerman and Diane Mazur
offer explanations of the decline of civil-military relations that
rely on these kinds of endogenous factors. For a more complete
and possibly more problematic understanding, however, we
should also examine the exogenous factors that contribute to
reshaping the relationships between the armed forces and
general society. In great part, civil-military relations have
changed because of the end of the Cold War, the new ubiquity
134. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address (Jan. 17, 1961), in PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1961, at 1035–40 (1961), available
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp.
135. Id.
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of information technology revolution, and the rise in
importance of nonstate actors, most notably of Al Qaeda.
First, since the end of the Cold War released state and
nonstate actors from the constraints of the superpower rivalry,
conflict has proliferated. As a result, the United States has
experienced a militarization of foreign relations. The increased
resources invested in diplomacy, public diplomacy, and
nonmilitary foreign aid pale in comparison to the proliferation
of Defense Department relations with foreign governments, the
influence of Regional Combatant Commands, and the impact of
military assistance programs. 136 Even without wartime
supplemental financing, the Defense Department budget is over
thirty times greater than that of the State Department.137 The
Department of Defense has approximately 1,400,000 service
members on Active Duty, 860,000 Reserve and National Guard,
and 790,000 civilians on installations in the United States and
around the world.138 The Department of State has approximately
29,000 employees.139 With far greater resources than the State
Department spread out over far-flung locations, the Department
of Defense plays ever greater roles in US foreign relations. And
many of the changes blur the lines between roles and missions
traditionally deemed military and those viewed as diplomatic or
political.
Second, the Information Revolution is constantly blurring
the lines between civil and military capacities, issues, and
campaigns. Cyber threats and cyber warfare can be conducted
by military or civilian authorities and against states, nonstate
entities, or individuals. Likewise, unmanned aerial vehicles are
being operated by military and nonmilitary organizations, often
with
operationally
indistinguishable
missions.
Global
information systems and highly flexible drones erase many of
the distinctions between the military and civilian spheres. These

136. The 2011 fiscal year budget for the Department of State was US$16.4 billion
(excluding foreign assistance), while the budget for the Department of Defense was
US$548.9 billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2010).
137. See id.
138. US DEP’T OF DEFENSE, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 8–9 (2010).
139. US DEP’T OF STATE, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 7–8 (2010).
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new technologies irrevocably blur the lines between war and
peace.
The war against Al Qaeda has rapidly accelerated the
breakdown between civil and military spheres because the US
has been fighting a “war” with a nonstate actor. The National
Command Authority is constantly deciding whether to employ
military or civilian assets in combating Al Qaeda. For example,
the president of the United States now possesses dramatically
expanded powers to order the killing of an individual outside a
traditional war zone. The law has been hard pressed to keep up
with these developments. The nature of the enemy (nonstate,
transnational), the tools available (weapons, cyber-media,
diplomacy, public affairs), and the laws and norms applicable
(humanitarian, human rights, domestic, privacy, and secrecy
laws) all shape the landscape in ways that inevitably alter civilmilitary relations. If this is emblematic of an epoch in which
sovereignty itself is in decline, then it will not be repaired with
the demise of Al Qaeda.
Diane Mazur and Bruce Ackerman’s new books make
important contributions, reminding us that the relationship
between civil society and the military matter for the nation’s
security and governance. These relationships do not inevitably
emerge from some natural concepts of war and peace or
categories of civilian and military, let alone from immutable
principles defining their interrelationships. 140 We must
constantly evaluate these relationships to preserve essential
values in the face of revolutionary change. The decisions made
by public authorities, such as Justice Rehnquist or President
Obama, have tremendous and sometimes unseen significance.
So too, do global trends far beyond their control. Perhaps the
most valuable contribution Professors Mazur and Ackerman
make is to reframe and restart a national discussion about the
relationship between our national security apparatus and our
republic.

140. See MICHAEL HOWARD, THE INVENTION OF PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 1 (Yale Univ. Press 2000) (2000) (quoting Sir Henry Maine’s
observation that “[w]ar “appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern
invention”).

